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9TOLERANCE, DEMOCRACY AND 
FUNDAMENTALISM(S): CHALLENGES IN 
TIME OF SYSTEMIC BIFURCATIONS
Guillermo Hansen, Argentina
The globalising and unsettling forces of capitalism, technology, cli­
mate changes, mass media and popular culture, chart a reality marked by 
fleetness, disorientation and rapid social change. Millions of people have 
reacted by identifying themselves with religious fundamentalist views. 
While this phenomenon cannot be reduced to a single factor, it nonethe­
less signals a state of distress suffered by those marginalised by the 
global economy, many of whom also feel culturally threatened by the 
“materialist” and “secular” values of late modernity.
Although fundamentalism in its many forms is certainly not keen on 
democracy, it is also true that the economic and political forces of late 
modernity are steadily driving existing (liberal) democracies into “states 
of exception”, posing also a peculiar threat to democratic principles. 
Hence democracy as a political system resting on values such as free­
dom, equality and the rule of civil law, is likely to be the real casualty of 
the struggle between fundamentalisms and globalization. Yet, democ­
racy may also be facing today a new opportunity stemming from below, 
where new modes, of relationships and power link - locally and globally 
- different religious identities, cultures, forms of labour, ecological 
concerns, ethnicities, and gender groups and issues. These new relation-
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ships disclose a common bio-political desire that rests on a pro-active 
exercise of tolerance as an affirmation of life in its multiple expressions. 
Tolerance, therefore, becomes a key “weapon” in democratic solutions 
to systemic problems.
While as moral beings we are always faced with ethical choices, our 
times on the verge of a “systemic bifurcation” accelerate the urgency to 
reach wide consensus over the values that will govern our lives. Free­
dom and equality have been focal desiderata of modernity, yet the his- 
toricist and progressive myth that cocooned these values is on the wane. 
Since values are not abstractions but always are embedded into mythical 
narratives, it is crucial to understand the modes of knowledge and cul­
tural mutations which are coupled with socio-political and systemic 
changes. Today, with an increasing pluralisation of societies and con­
sciousness, tolerance appears not only as a desirable moral virtue, but as 
a necessary systemic quality which, once grafted with freedom and 
equality, makes of democracy the best arrangement for shaping our 
collective and global fate. Within this horizon, religion(s) seems again to 
be poised to play a critical role - either for or against tolerance, democ­
racy and peace.
1. From the Republic to the Empire
(a) Symptoms of a transition
When approaching the relation between fundamentalism, tolerance 
and democracy, we may be tempted to fall into the vice of binary 
thought. Media, news, reports and discourses can lead to the conclusion 
that democracy - broadly defined1 - is today at peril because of the
i Democracy understood as a set of institutional and legal principles and practic­
es such as: the rule of law and equal access to justice; division of powers; guar­
antees of human and civil rights that are upheld and independently monitored; 
free and fair elections involving a genuine competition of ideas, permitting
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“external” and “evil” forces of religious fundamentalism (especially 
Islamic). Samuel Huntington’s highly influential theory of the clash of 
civilisations, for example, has given an academic veneer to a political 
paradigm that compartmentalises in antagonist camps what actually are 
inner dimensions of the contemporary world-system. This creates a false 
impression and consciousness, for the real danger to “democracy” may 
lie not only with those who, for whatever reasons, express their griev­
ances against the hypocrisy of core “democratic” countries, but also with 
those forces which in the name of democratic values are increasingly 
committed to intolerant and vigilant practices. Obviously, inherent to the 
different forms of fundamentalism is the prospective establishment of 
regimes of intolerance, thus creating a formidable challenge to democ­
racy as a system as well as a cultural horizon. But this cannot hide the 
fact that “democracies” around the world are increasingly sliding toward 
a perennial “state of exception” where freedom is curtailed in the name 
of freedom - as once Latin-American dictatorships curtailed democracy 
in the name of democracy.2
consensual, non-violent changes of government; freedom of speech, press and 
media; healthy, autonomous civil society institutions and networks, independent 
of the state; accountability of authority and transparency of decisions; en­
trenched property and economic rights; social justice and basic security; an ethos 
of dialogue, questioning, trust, and moral awareness; widespread, free access to 
the information needed to discuss, scrutinize, make choices about and uphold all 
these components of a democratic society. Behind these principles lay certain 
core values such as the political equality of all citizens; open deliberation before 
decision-making so that all can voice their interests and concerns; a high degree 
of citizen participation in the processes of democracy, that respects and 
rages the different views of others; a pluralism of institutions and the indepen­
dence of critical voices that maintain the long-term health and openness of dem­
ocratic societies.
2 In Stato di eccezione, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben shows how 
Western democracies become effectively invested with the need of turning 
emergency into the foundation of their existence. The military and the economic 
“state of emergency” often merge into one, employing war metaphors as main 
currency in public speeches. He states that “The principle according to which 
necessity defines a singular situation in which the law loses its vis obligandi... is 
inverted into that according to which necessity constitutes, so to speak, the
encou-
176 Overcoming Fundamentalism
In order to situate the dynamics linking fundamentalism with the 
contemporary neo-conservative “states of exception”, it is essential to 
have a systemic view of the present globalised world-system. This alr 
lows us to perceive fundamentalism - evangelical, Islamic and integrist 
- as symptoms marking the passage to a new state of affairs.3 As Mi­
chael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue, fundamentalisms signal a refusal 
of modernity, democracy and secularity, which - rightly or wrongly - 
are conceived as weapons of “liberal,” foreign or. Western hegemony.4 
But fundamentalist movements are not simply pre-modern remnants, but 
a late-modern outcome of contradictions triggered by modernity and its 
oppressive underside. They are late- or post-modem in a double sense: 
in that chronologically they follow and oppose modernity, and in that 
culturally they ride on the waves generated by the falling walls of mod­
em (and Western) philosophical theories which placed religion in an 
interdict.5
The late-modern condition of fundamentalism requires that we take a 
look at the long-term economic, political, cultural and epistemological 
dynamics that characterise the present “world-system.” In doing so we 
understand why democracy and tolerance acquire today a new urgency, 
for we face a critical moment of systemic oscillations that points to an 
imminent bifurcation. Inspired by chaos theory, the social scientist Im­
manuel Wallerstein6 maintains that an existing system which can no 
longer function adequately within its defined parameters faces a bifurca-
ultimate foundation and the very source of the law.” Staio di eccezione (Torino: 
Bollati Boringhieri, 2003), p. 37.
3 See Antonio Negri & Michael Hardt, Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), pp. 137ss.
4 See Ibid., p. 149.
5 This notion is developed by yet another Italian philosopher, Gianni Vattimo, in 
“La huella de la huella,” Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo, eds, La religion 
(Madrid: PPC, 1996), p. 11 If.
6 Immanuel Wallerstein, World-System Analysis: an Introduction (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2004); and Id., The Uncertainties of Knowledge (Phila­
delphia: Temple University press, 2004).
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lion where a “choice” is pressed upon it. It is not that one of the present 
antagonistic camps within the system will prevail, but that the system as 
a whole will'change. In this junction, institutions and social arrange­
ments face a new set of possibilities: either a radicalisation of democ­
ratic principles and practices, or the adventurous falling into new hierar­
chical and intolerant tutelages. These are the main contenders, and the 
outcome will depend upon the. micro-decisions or small actions that 
people take in times of wild oscillations. History - we have come to 
learn - does not have any moral vector; it is not necessarily a tale of 
increasing humanness, tolerance, liberty or equality. Our “evolution” 
seems to be a highly improvised affair, where values are subject to end­
less psychological, philosophical, ideological, existential and religious 
variables, emerging and competing as we face the challenges of living.
Therefore we find ourselves in the crucible of uncertainties, and yet 
this period in our lives has a tremendous and extraordinary importance 
because the intellectual, moral and political decisions made will have 
exponential effects. For this reason fundamentalism cannot be dismissed 
as a romantic reversal of history, destined to fail because history always 
“progresses”. Actually, it must be seriously considered as one of the 
possible outcomes of late modernity - although we may question its 
long term adaptive value. In times where interdictions against religion 
are falling, this dimension of human living may be destined to play a 
critical role in democracy’s demise or, on the contrary, in its flourish­
ing.7
(b) The longue duree: tolerance, intolerance, and violence
A systemic view posits as unit of analysis a “world-system”, namely, 
a spatial/temporal region that cuts across political and cultural units, 
creating an integrated zone of activity with institutions that obey certain
7 It is ironic that modern democracy, whose roots can partially be traced to a 
reaction against religious intolerance (Locke et al.), may today require the mys­
tique and conviction given by religion.
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systemic rules. The modem world-system, which traces its origins to the 
European expansion beginning in the 16th century, is not bound by a 
unitary political structure - although after the second world war, liberal 
democracy purported to be the desirable political regime. In fact, there 
can be and there are many political units within a world-system since its 
unifying factor is not a political regime or a culture, but the division of 
labour that results from the pursuit of gain. The endless accumulation of 
capital, which splits the system along a core and a periphery, in turn 
determines the nature or kind of this division.
During the 19lh and 20,h centuries the political history of the modem 
world-system, radiating from its core, became the history of a debate 
about the line that divides the included from the excluded, as well as 
about the tenor, extent and limits of tolerance. It must be noticed that 
this debate was occurring “within the framework of a geo-culture that 
proclaimed the inclusion of all as the definition of the good society”.9 
This geo-culture was Liberalism, which proved to be a formidable ideo­
logical force, acquiring a solid hegemony around 1848. Not only did it 
establish the juridical and institutional foundations to be emulated by 
most of the countries in the world, but it also had the plasticity to absorb 
the anti-systemic movements originated under its sway. Inside the na­
tion-states, attempts by groups to achieve inclusion as full citizens were 
the central focus of radical movements. First it was the turn of industrial 
workers, who once organised in unions and syndicates then sought po-
!
8
8 The core, the “comfort zone,” does not necessarily have to coincide with na­
tions or states, but with the dominant sectors of the production process cutting 
across them. However, since monopolies need the patronage of strong states, 
there is a geographical consequence of the core-periphery relationship. It is also 
the case that the same country or nation may present a mix of core and periph­
eral conditions. Usually, core-products and services are monopolies or quasi­
monopolies, while peripheral products and services are truly “competitive”, that 
is, abundant and diverse. Thus, when there is exchange for core products and 
services felt as critical and crucial for the advancement of well being of popula­
tions, an unequal or asymmetrical situation develops.
9 Wallerstein, World-System, p. 60.
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litical power. After decades of struggle, the outcome was the compro­
mise represented by the Welfare State. After that, beginning in the 
1960s, the “excluded” from full participation and decision - ethnic and 
sexual minorities, oppressed majorities in the colonies, youth and 
women - voiced their anti-systemic claims through “cultural” strategies 
that sought the decolonisation of the psyche and political autonomy. All 
these movements were more or less successful in achieving full citizen­
ship and/or independence, but did not succeed in terms of fully redress­
ing systemic dynamics of exclusion.
In the case of the present world-system, the 1960's marked the end 
of the liberal supremacy, thereby dislocating the geo-culture that had 
kept the political institutions intact.10 Decolonisation, women’s move­
ments, youth culture and labour, gender issues, vindication of difference 
and minorities, concern for the environment, have unhinged the under­
pinnings of the capitalist world-economy and exposed it to the full force 
of political and cultural shocks from which it has hitherto been shel­
tered.11 During the same time, previously existing fundamentalist trends 
started to gain cultural, social and political ascendancy in different cor­
ners of the world.12 Cultural transformations soon lead to a new self­
esteem and political demands, which in turn put new pressures upon the 
system through the expansion of lineal trends. The result is that in the 
last fifty years there has been a growing squeeze on the average rate of 
profits, for costs of production have been rising while the margin of 
surplus is narrowing in core and some peripheral regions. Capitalist
10 This corresponds to what Eric Hobsbawm calls the end of the “golden age.” 
See The Age of Extremes: a History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Vin­
tage Books, 1994).
11 See Wallerstein, p. 77; Hobsbawm, p. 343.
12 In the case of Islamic Fundamentalism, the 1967 Israeli-Arab war signals a 
turning point. See Bassam Tibi, “The worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamental­
ism: Attitudes toward Modern Science and Technology," in Martin Marty and 
Scott Appelby, eds, Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the 
Family and Education (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 81.
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production had to face increasing costs in remuneration and salaries, 
inputs (infrastructure and raw materials), and taxation. Especially the 
first and the third trend can be said to be a consequence of increasing 
socio-political demands expressing new expectations regarding stan­
dards of living, education, health and prospects for the future.
Of course, capitalist endeavours will always attempt to maintain oli­
gopolistic conditions; our present neo-liberal phase - which in Latin 
America was enacted by a capitalism of dispossession geared mostly to 
the “enclosing the commons”13 - is an example. The “Washington Con­
sensus” gave new impetus to institutions such as the IMF, WTO and the 
WEF (Davos), which in turn exercised pressure for a type of globaliza­
tion which consisted in the opening of all frontiers to the free flows of 
goods and capital - but not of people and/or labour.14 In the midst of this 
process, 9/11 served to legitimise the more conservative sectors within 
some “core” states by giving them new political clout. These events 
allowed for a drastic cut of its links with the more moderate centre and 
so undo the cultural and social transformations dating from the 1960s. 
The most dramatic result of this process has been the replacement of 
neo-liberalism by neo-conservatism - a force supported by a religiously 
sanctioned view that is culturally and politically at war with the free­
doms and social conquests of the last four decades.15
But these reactions, far from setting “order” and restoring “equilib­
rium” to the system, have in fact accelerated the cycle of crisis leading
13 A Marxist notion developed by David Harvey to refer to the reversion of 
common property rights and the commodification of cultural forms, histories, 
intellectual creativity, the environment, genetic information, public works, 
health and education. Capitalism resolved its cyclical crisis by expanding its 
secular trends; but in the new era of globalization the possibility of overflowing 
towards an “other” (land, population, and market) decreases. The New 
Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 137ff.
14 See Nestor Garcia Canclini, La glohalizacidn imaginada (Buenos Aires: 
Paidds, 1999); Zygmunt Bauman, La glohalizacidn: consecuencias humanas 
(Buenos Aires: FCE, 1999).
15 See Harvey, p. 184.
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to a general global state of war. The secular trends are moving to 
ymptotic point blocking the unrestrained continuation of an endless 
accumulation of capital, the engine of capitalist development. We 
thus treading upon a territory whose horizon shows great social turmoil, 
responding to various factors: first, the very fluctuations of the system; 
second, the decline in legitimacy of state structures, and third, the cul­
tural crisis of prevailing symbolic systems, all of which leads to a great 
conflict about the nature of the successor arrangement. As Eric Hobs- 
bawm asserts, “The world of the third millennium will ...almost cer­
tainly continue to be one of violent politics and violent political changes. 
The only thing uncertain about them is where they will lead.”16
What sectors, forces and ideologies will dominate in the upcoming 
arrangement? Shall we speak of a system or multi-systems? What values 
will be paramount? One thing is certain: the present world-system, ideo­
logically dominated by a centre-liberal outlook, has now achieved its 
full maturity. It will do anything possible to ameliorate the crisis, even 
adopting conservative discourses to suit the demands of electorates 
determined to behave in customary ways in the pursuit of short-term 
benefits.17 Precisely because the fluctuation and uncertainties are be­
coming more acute, the demand for security will be stronger - and so, 
too, the violence.18 “States of exception” are slowly erected as para-
a as-
are
16 Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, p. 460.
17 It is unrealistic to think that most people would willingly change their work 
patterns, technology and methods of exchanging goods and services in anticipa­
tion of a crisis whose results are utterly unknown. Anthropologically there is 
ample evidence to support the notion of “improvised evolution,” which assumes 
that there is a general unwillingness in most peoples in all societies to deal with 
crisis. We often wait, and then choose short-term minimal strategies. See Marvin 
Harris, Culture, People and Nature (New York: HarperCollins, 1988).
18 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri link this form of security to the contempo­
rary strategies of biopower: “Security requires rather actively and constantly 
shaping the environment through military and/or police activity. Only an active 
shaped world is a secure world. This notion of security is a form pf biopower, 
then, in the sense that it is charged with the task of producing and transforming 
social life....” Multitude (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), p. 20.
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digms for political rule, where all citizens are placed under permanent 
suspicion and surveillance (“Patriot Act”). Moreover, as stated in the 
(in) famous ideological blueprint of the Bush’s administration, Project 
for the New American Century (1997), military strength and foreign 
territorial control become necessary steps in the larger project of spread­
ing “appropriate” codes of conduct upon the rest of the world.19 This 
violence exercised in the pursuit of “security” - doubtful ends combined 
with immoral means - has received a strong “popular” backing and the 
ideological support from a growing social and cultural force - evangeli­
cal fundamentalism, a backbone of contemporary neo-conservatism.20 In 
this fashion, liberty is curtailed in the name of security, which in turn 
exacerbates inequality.
“Discomfort zones”, however, also spawn mirror images to this neo­
conservative “state of exception.” In these other zones, a similar phe­
nomenon takes place through different forms of integrism and funda­
mentalism that promises a safer and more fulfilling world by submitting 
to new heteronomous codes and arrangements. Often this entails a rejec­
tion of the priority of universal rights and civil law, a refusal of the 
equality of men and women, a dismissal of the separation of “religion” 
and state, and a rebuff of general democratic values. Yet these are chiral, 
that is, they are not identical to their mirror image. While neo­
conservatism, at least in the US, receives the backing of an evangelical 
fundamentalism thoroughly supportive of the system, Islamic fundamen­
talisms, on the other hand, present an anti-systemic bent that makes it 
one of the most formidable counter-systemic claims. This integrist pro­
ject, however, also presents an insurmountable conflict of values, for 
liberty is curtailed in the name of equality, which in turn exacerbates 
insecurity
19 See Harvey, pp. 184s.
20 See Walter Mead, “God’s Country,” in Foreign Affairs 85/5 (Sept.-Oct. 2006), 
pp. 24-43.
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But whether we speak of (evangelical) neo-conservatism or Islamic
fundamentalism, both phenomena possess a common pattern creating 
similar effects. Their common theme is either the lowering of tolerance 
or the open'practice of intolerance, which puts in interdiction the very
nature of democracy. Both neo-conservative “states of exception!’ as
well as integrist Islamic fundamentalism have an in-built tendency .to­
ward intolerance and the negation of the-other-in part because the illu­
sion that a system can be stabilised by eliminating some of its compo­
nents, in part because of the very epistemological limits inherent to their 
ideological view.
This systemic transition and bifurcation .isy therefore, also a cultural 
and epistemological mutation, for the structures of knowledge constitute 
an integral -and dialectical- dimension: of the cultural complex that 
undergirds any social formation. Technological innovation, mass media, 
socio-political reorganisation, demographic pressures and ecological 
imbalances, also change the way people reason, .affecting thereby reli­
gious and ideological views and mores. The questioning of canons of 
rationality, the legitimating of certain modes of knowing, and the estab­
lishment or debunking of frontiers between different areas of living, 
symptoms of the repositioning of sociaj bodies which feel freer or .urged 
to experiment and adopt views which hitherto have been, marginal or 
rejected. Grievances voice the “insurrection of subjugated knowledges” 
against hegemonic ideologies (Foucault). As .a. result, times of bifurca­
tion witness strong and intense cultural debate seeking to mediate, the 
crisis by offering different strategies - symbolic environments - to man­
age instability, uncertainty and stress. Some will attempt to reinforce the 
cyclical state of equilibrium, while others will push the lineal trends into 
a state of imbalance.
We shall return later to this point. Before that let us look at .an exam­
ple of intolerance and counter-modernity stemming from another pe­
ripheral zone: the Latin American context. For a third phenomenon lies
are
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between the outspoken intent to install a new regime of intolerance, as in 
some Islamic fundamentalist groups, and evangelical fundamentalism’s 
efforts to effect a neo-conservative shift in family life and educational 
patterns. Roman Catholic integrism claims to navigate, between the 
Scylla of an. excessive focus on family and the Charybdis of a blatant 
overturn of social structures, seeking a middle course cutting across the 
intermediary associations of civil society. Yet, it shares with evangelical 
and Islamic fundamentalisms a common factor: they are all symptoms of 
a disease to which they purport to be the cure.
2. The Long and Winding Road of Catholic Integrism
. Roman Catholicism (RC) is still the major religious force in most of 
Latin America. It is more than a religious denomination: it is a powerful 
social organization with an extraordinary cultural-formative power. 
Even though Protestants, Evangelicals and Pentecostals have experi­
enced a steady growth during the last century, Catholicism still domi­
nates the religious scene.21
Many assert that the category “fundamentalism” cannot be applied 
stricto sensu lo Roman Catholicism. Fundamentalism -they say- is a 
valid descriptfon for a Protestant phenomenon whose origin is clearly 
located in the beginning of the 20lh Century in the U.S., applicable today 
to the global evangelical movement that it has spawned. There are many 
elements that characterize evangelical (or Islamic) fundamentalism 
which are not present in the ultra-conservative sectors of Roman Ca­
tholicism.22 Yet, while a functionalist approach to individual aspects of
21 The Muslim presence is reduced to few ethnic enclaves.
22 Take, for example, inerrancy of Scriptures, something difficult to assert for a 
church that has stressed as normative sources both Bible and its ongoing inter­
pretation by a Magisterialn (tradition). Or consider the evangelical-subjective 
emphasis on rebirth (bom again), an awkward concept for the objectivist and 
sacramental self understanding of Roman Catholicism.
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both traditions may fail in providing a useful comparative scenario, a 
more structural perspective uncovers in fundamentalism and the ultra­
conservative camp of Roman Catholicism a common regressive gestalt 
that attempts to undo the cultural revolutions stemming from the 1960s 
and thus discipline democratic demands.23 They are, in this regard, a 
powerful ideological resource for the implementation of “states of ex­
ception”. •
As in evangelical fundamentalism, Catholic ultra-conservatism seeks 
to resituate church and traditional beliefs in the face of the crisis brought 
by modernity and secularisation. The efforts to preserve the traditional 
ideological and organisational traits, and arrest and reverse the waning 
of Catholic hegemony in the social, cultural and political spheres, are 
similar. Yet battle lines are drawn according to the specific cultural and 
social geography. In the case of evangelicals, scriptural inerrancy, crea­
tionism, virginal birth, pre-millennialism, etc. are the main themes that 
rally the strands of an ideology embracing a host of ethical issues rang^ 
ing from public education to abortion. In the case of RC, the authority of 
the Pope, the strict hierarchical organization, the objectivity of dogma, 
and the discipline and control of (mostly female) sexuality, is at stake. 
Even their conception of the role of the church in society, and the means 
for Christian influence in culture, are as diverse as the Calvinist and 
Thomist roots of their political theologies. Yet their common thread is 
the combination of an unrelenting resistance to the disruptive changes 
brought by modernity,, the attempt to re-create stable institutions, and a 
strong political vocation to “fight back” and re-establish a social order 
congruent with the conservative mores of their religious vision. Both
231 understand regressive in the sense of attempting to preserve in contemporary 
milieu the beliefs and practices from a sacred past as normative for today. Yet, it 
must also be born in mind that it is not simply a romantic reaction, but a deliber­
ate effort to re-create social and political order that is oriented to the future. Cfr. 
Martin Marty and Scott Appclby, Fundamentalisms and Society, p. 3. As to the 
reaction to gender issues stemming from the 60s, see Hardacre, in Ibid, p. 134.
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traditions feel that legal and governmental processes must recognise the 
way ofiife they see:as prescribed by'God and;set forth in Scripture or 
the Magisterialn. The state must be subservient to God, thus disciplining 
a society that has'lost its moral core and direction.
• i The particular Catholic^ conservative vision is1 nourished by two ideo­
logical streams that'have significantly-shaped the Catholic-profile-in 
many countries of Latin America: integralism and integrism.
' Catholic integralism is the name given to the curial opposition in the 
late-19-century and’early 20-century to the “heresies” of modernism. At 
that time these heresies included the critical-historical studies of Bible 
and dogma, the Darwinian theory of evolution, liberal democracy, so­
cial isitK- trade unions, free masonry and Protestants. Above all it cham­
pioned a> Christendom model of social order and the close relation be­
tween church and state. In sum, it represented the static categorization of 
tradition and-the defence of an Objectivist view of truth. Only an integral 
Catholicism, that is^-the upholding Of dogma and Mdgisterium, guaran­
tees an institutional strength and'clarity-of beliefs that can be applied-to 
alh challenges and needs of-contemporary society. This view of Catholi­
cism is totalv-tinwavering and' exclusivist, inviting to a .sort of anti­
modern crusade in the pursuit of a new social Catholicism (Cato/zmmo 
Total or- Integral).
r --'Integrism,'on the other hand, is an expression coined by the French 
right-wing intellectual Charles Maurras denoting the aim of bringing all 
aspects of a nation within a single political organisation. In this view 
Roman Catholicism is regarded :as an integral aspect of the political 
structure-of-the country, along with'language, customs and tradition. 
This version of integrism came to Latin America mixed with Spanish 
falangism and Italian fascism, all characterised by a strong corporatist 
view of state and society.24 1
i -
. : • } r
24 In Argentina many sectors that converged into Peronism, as well as the natio­
nalist party within the military, have historically Supported this view. During the
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Today “integrism” and.‘‘integral-ism” are used indiscriminately ;to re­
fer.to those sectors within Catholicism-,that views.the core-beliefs,p.f 
Catholicism as integral to the nation’s - or..the continent’s.-r.-.identity; 
This type of Catholicism proved to be quite strong in the first half of the 
20'h- century, losing some position's in-the-1950sian’d 60s* to gain a proS 
tagonist role during the military dictatdrsliips"(ln!Argdntiha, T976* 1983)1 
Since then, an increasing pluralisation of the Catholic Church has been 
the norm, although the core ideological elements of integnism.still colour 
vast sectors of this church - especially among clergy and-bishops. - Dur^ 
ing the 1990s, coinciding (paradoxically?) with the enforcement of neo-t 
liberal policies,: several jntegrist..“congregations” and religious- societies 
were either created;*or. pre-existing ones, spread; .with . new., ^vigour. 
Among these are: Opus Dei; Miles: Christi, ■ Comunion: y Liberacion, 
Legionarios de Cristo (Juventud Misionera y Familia Misioriera), Aso- 
ciacion Profamilia, Tradicioii-Familia-Propiedad- (although waning 
during the 1990s); Institute del Verbo Encarnado, Sodalilium Christia* 
nae Vitae, Comunidad Jerusalen, Camino Neocatecumenal, F.-A.S.T.A.7 
and many others. ' '
.Following an ultra-conservative interpretation- of .Vatican .II,. these 
organisations stress lay discipleship in Society^, education and the forma­
tion of leadership, full engagement,in,Ahe. “cultural.wars’’ relating.to 
abortion and homosexuality, Confrontation with the “progressive” liberal 
values spread by the media*, opposition tp the ideology of public schools, 
and so'on. They loudly declare allegiance to the Pope, a feature'that 
distinguishes -them from other parallel integrist associations, properly
r.
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60s and 70s, it reached a gruesome, .‘‘maturation*’ through, the Doctrine of Na­
tional Security, the ideological umbrella that supported the-military dictatorship 
in its repression and disappearance of those “elements” considered subversive, of 
the (Catholic) values and mores of.the Argentine Nation. “Heresies":acquired 
social and political form, and culprits must be wiped out in order to purify the 
foundations of the polis. ' • ' .'V ] » % * fc •*
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called traditionalists.25 Yet they belong to the same wave of religious 
and ideological discontent with modernity and the liberal (and libera- 
tionist) interpretation of Vatican II.26
3. Cultural and Epistemological Strategies: the Flight from 
Plurality towards a Post-modern Ununi
Militancy, exclusivism, a “fight against the world” attitude, and a 
profound distaste for (philosophical) relativism and (ideological) plural­
ism appear to be a common mark uniting different forms of religious 
fundamentalism and integrism. Boundary setting, identification of ene­
mies, proselytism, creation and strengthening of intermediate, institutions 
stand out as important watermarks. They also share some common 
moral positions, such as patriarchal models of family, antiabortion and 
homophobic stances, promotion of religious education in schools, etc. In 
sum, a counter-modem and anti-secularisation attitude seems to galva-
25 In the line’of Lefebvre and others, the latter are schismatic groups (mostly 
clergy) setting up their own Magisterium, questioning the reforms introduced by 
Vatican II regarding the Roman missal, collegiality of bishops, ecumenism and 
the recognition of religious freedoms.
26 The argentine sociologist Fortunato Mallimaci distinguishes three strands in 
the integrist camp within the Argentine church. The first one is a small ultra­
nationalist and anti-democratic minority that still cultivates a special relation­
ship with the Military, the alleged institutional paladin of argentine and Latin- 
American identity. A second one, no doubt the majority, prioritizes the streng­
thening of the theological and ecclesial dimensions in order to face the modern­
ist challenge in society and culture. Their main assumption is that a popular and 
ancestral Catholic heritage is today challenged not by atheism and communism, 
but by secularization, laicism, moral relativism, hedonism, consumerism, femin­
ism, sects, and the liberal (or “progressive”) message of the media. They also 
have strong qualms regarding democracy. Many bishops and clergy, as well as 
numerous lay associations advocating traditional family values, are ideologically 
identified with this line. Finally a more populist form of integrism is camouf­
laged with a public and vociferous defence of the poor and marginalized. With a 
language resembling the left-wing criticisms of globalization and capitalism, 
they are firm defenders of the social doctrine of the church. See Fortunato Mal­
limaci, “El Catolicismo latinoamericano a fines del milenio: incertidumbres 
desde el Cono Sur,” Nueva Sociedad 136 (1995), pp. 154-176.
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nise their focus. Yet there are some features in these movements that are 
clearly “late-modern” and even “post-modern”: Opus Dei and most 
evangelicals, for instance, do not seem inimical to such “modem”, phe­
nomena as capitalism, bureaucratic organisation, mass communication 
technologies or higher education.2? This indicates that'they are not-sim­
ply anti-modern, but rather critical of those aspects of the modern" that 
are perceived to be threatening to their core beliefs, their social organi­
sation and ideology. While capitalism is not considered such a threat, 
cultural developments leading to a pluralisation of consciousness and 
views certainly are.28 This (late) modern pluralisation of the cultural 
realm is perceived as an insurmountable, inimical, and hostile stance 
against church, faith; nature and truths
As a strategy facing pluralisation and secularity, fundamentalisms 
and integrisrh share a highly cognitive doctrinal religiosity marked by an 
objectivistic, dogmatic, legalistic and dissonant style. The claim to “ob­
jectivity” revamps a hermeneutical circle unaffected by human experi­
ence, interests and location. In a way they simply continue the “episte­
mological objectivism” of the West, with reality conceived as though it 
were composed by foundational blocks or bricks which possess, a certain 
order and relationship. To uphold the truth means to respect this struc­
ture and order. This epistemological mapping (worldview) possesses an 
intrinsic appeal that is coupled with deep-seated tendencies of the hu 
man psyche. Such a worldview seems to infer no conflicting expecta 
tions or suggestions for human daily behaviour and ethical “decisions” 
As the anthropologist Anthony Wallace asserts, there is a predisposition 
to be infatuated with a worldview that promises order, for this is per­
ceived as diminishing stress. It is associated with every satisfaction 
derived from life and with the maintenance and reproduction Of life
. j. 1 .1
27 Cfr. Emilio Corbiere, Opus Dei: el totalitarismo catdlico. Buenos Aires: 
Editorial Sudamericana, 2002.
28 Cfr. Peter Berger, Una Gloria lejana: la busqueda de lafe en tpoca de incre- 
dulidad (Barcelona: Herder, 1994), p. 93.
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itself.29 Consequently any element that produces disturbances in this 
worldview implies, automatically, a disturbance in the rules of behav­
iour and therefore in the satisfactions expected from life. The cognitive 
and the moral are,- at this point, indistinguishable, and the terrain for the 
struggle sweeps across the multiple cultural choices in an effort to 
streamline them according to a divine norm.
Yet, what (late) modernity has brought to the fore is that the nature 
of reality as such is complex,-and therefore requires multiple metaphors 
and views in order to be understood.3^ Any monolithic conceptual sys­
tem will soon prove inconsistent and unable of establishing congruence 
with the diverse metaphors and symbols required for life in complex 
settings. In the end fundamentalisms and integrisms prove not only 
incapable of "surmounting dissonance, but they become fertile terrain for 
new crisis. This generates additional cognitive dissonance, which may at 
best be able to offer'a “solution” for individuals within modernity, but 
not to the injustices brought about by-modem-arrangements. As much of 
late-modem trends, they offer biographical-individual solutions to sys­
temic-problems.31
Integrism as fundamentalism expresses a cognitive strategy, which 
tries to homogenise what is radically plural. Against this background it 
can be considered as a form of superstition (super stare, standing over 
something that is a vestige from the past), to the extent that they intend 
to' recreate conceptions of nature, society, culture arid self which are 
thought or imagined as once having wide currency. Although to a cer­
tain point they share many of the traces of religious revitalisation
• ;
29 See Anthony Wallace, Revitalizations and Mazeways: Essays on Culture 
Change, vqj. 1 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), p. 182.
30 Cfr. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embod­
ied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 
1999), p. 78 • • -
31 Cfr. Zygmunt Bauman, La sociedad sitiada (Buenos Aires:-FCE, 2004), p. 94:
However, this is not the case with Islamic fundamentalism(s), which are-mostly 
counter-systemic movements. :
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movements, that is, the deliberate, organised and conscious effort to 
construct a more satisfying culture and social environment,32 they are 
epistemologically unable to produce what these movements successfully 
do: a widespread reduction and/or redirection of stress. Therefore it 
would be more adequate to consider fundamentalisms as truncated revi­
talisation movements, for they are constantly tempted to idealise a past 
in face of the perils of the present.
The integrist-fundamentalist cognitive incongruence and the psycho­
logical stress produced even on its own membership shows that its ap­
peal can only be partial. Very few can bear the implications of trans­
forming the self as is required and demanded by these movements. 
Moreover, in a pluralised scenario marked by “increasing reflexivity” 
questioning authority, globalization and an enhanced consciousness of 
diversity,33 the chances to “discipline” both the religious and political 
body are increasingly difficult. This incapacity creates a loop-effect of 
pressure and tensions which cannot Be resolved by the religious system 
as such. The temptation, therefore, is to seek to reduce incongruence not 
by. modifying the symbolic system (which would imply a thorough revi­
sion.of “objective” truth),, but by confronting the societal and cultural 
conditions which generate such stressful stimuli. Sooner or later, vio­
lence -»including its many subtle forms - would have to be exercised Or 
legitimised in order to vindicate the truth of the religious-ideological 
system. •
In sum, different fundamentalisms appear to share a common 
counter-cultural strategy that is linked to the social, cultural and eco­
nomic conditions of globalization and late-modemity. Facing the dislo­
cation created by capitalism and modernity, their aim is to influence 
societies and cultures by encouraging high uncertainty avoidance, sanc-
32 See Wallace, p. 10.
33 See Peter Taylor, Modernities: A Geoliistorical Interpretation (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 133f.
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tioning power distance, stressing the collective rather than the individual 
and giving prominence to the masculine rather than the feminine.34 In 
this strategy stand prominently matters pertaining to sexuality, family 
and above all, the role of women.35 These issues not only have to do 
with the enforcement of patriarchal property rights and male monopoly 
of the labour market, but also with a definite notion of communal repro­
duction where women are perceived to be the most reliable agents in the 
transmission of culture and religion. Because modern economic pres­
sures invariably change family patterns and gender roles, “womb” and 
“school” appear as the battlefront of fundamentalist and integrist reac­
tion - the first term signifying the power to control reproduction (a sort 
of container: of male prerogative to fulfil an ironclad biological and 
divine law), and the second representing the entrance gate into the pub­
lic sphere.
4. The Ethical Foundation of Tolerance
Cognitive, social and cultural uncertainties make of fundamentalisms 
and integrism direct or indirect supporters of political regimes set to
34 Cfr. Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1997), pp. 14ff.
35 See Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven and London: Yale Universi­
ty Press, 1997), pp. 64ff. This cognitive objectivism, distaste for pluralism, and 
legalistic outlook is illustrated in the case of Roman Catholic integrism by its 
militant opposition to issues ranging from the introduction of sexual education in 
schools and the distribution of condoms in state hospitals, to gay rights (civil 
union) and the decriminalisation of abortion. The war metaphor acquires new 
currency, as denoted by the statements of integrist ideologues when referring to 
feminism, one of the disturbing “dissonances” in late modernity. According to 
Adolfo Castaneda, director of Vida Humana Internacional and a consultant for 
the integrist circles in Latin America, we are facing a “cultural subversion,” 
where “'gender perspectives' represent one of the most dangerous ideological 
weapons mustered to destroy life and family, and therefore, society.” That such 
views exist in the pluralistic setting of late modernity must not alarm us; what is 
cause for alarm is their active pursuit of political means to enforce their vision of 
a Catolicismo integral.
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curb the range of tolerant practices and democratic demands. Many 
times this position adopts the form of an open protest against globaliza­
tion and its discontents, thus coinciding with other forms of protest 
stemming from the “left.”36 But their strategies for change pursue a rigid 
cultural reinforcement of religious and traditional values, which se­
verely questions not only the actual shortcomings of “really existing 
democracies”, but also the core values that inform and sustain democ­
ratic practices in any of its forms. When globalization, democracy and 
secularisation are lumped together as a threat, when pluralism and epis­
temological uncertainties are seen as equally eroding the very fabric of 
human society, then violence and intolerance appear as suitable weapons 
in an already violent and increasingly intolerant environment.- •
In effect, uncertainty, pluralism, relativity, radical difference, liquid 
boundaries, diffuse hierarchy, soft epistemology, in sum, that which 
culturally characterises late modernity, represents a dreadful and de­
monic horizon that true believers must avoid and fight at all costs. While 
these late-modern variables appear to be easier to digest for certain sec­
tors of comfort zones, fundamentalist movements - especially Islamic 
and evangelicals outside the U.S. - seem to provide a consoling re­
sponse to the losers, subordinated, excluded and/or threatened by global 
cultural and economic trends.37 When differences of culture, ethnicity 
and religion coincide with class and/or geopolitical subordinations, the 
terrain appears particularly fertile for fundamentalist recipes. Here we 
face a monumental systemic challenge, pressing for new understandings 
of democracy, tolerance and the effective redressing of economic and 
social inequalities.
36 Cfr. Hard and Negri, Multitude, pp. 235f.
37 Cfr. William McNeill, “Fundamentalisms and the World of the 1990s”, in 
Fundamentalisms and Society, pp. 558ff. One problem of his account is that he 
does not pay enough attention to the systemic dimension of fundamentalism, and 
the class component of it. Rather, he sees it mostly as a strategy that minimises 
friction in the transition from rural to urban life.
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But in spite of the somehow defiant nature of the fundamentalist 
phenomena, one cannot forget what Hardt and Negri have noted, 
namely, that these reactions are symptoms signalling a passage to a new 
social, political and economic arrangement. The tragedy is that funda­
mentalism purports to be a cure, encouraging its social base through a 
strategy that curbs democratic practices, labelling plurality, diversity or 
tolerance as a surrender to “materialism”, “consumerism”, the cultural 
“decadence” of the “West,” or with the hypocrisy of neo-colonialism. Is 
it possible to decouple the waning forces of the “world-system” from the 
values associated with democratic practices? Is “democracy” indissol­
ubly tied to the cultural and political history of the West? Can the value 
and practice of tolerance be proven to these popular movements as an 
equally effective way to redress social, cultural and economic griev­
ances?
It is true that when we speak about tolerance there is a certain arbi­
trariness in our definition or, if you will, a definite cultural and social 
tradition that informs our understanding. “Intolerance” may well not be 
a label accepted by the members of fundamentalist or integrist rnove- 
ments. They may also conceive themselves as somehow tolerant, if 
tolerance is understood as a passive forbearance. Yet tolerance is not 
only a relational term referring to an attitude vis-a-vis other existences, 
but also a practice whose definition is relative to the consideration and 
balancing of other values and moral goods. Paramount among these is 
the moral valuing of difference and plurality, thorns difficult to with­
stand not only from a fundamentalist position, but also by other philoso­
phies, practices and ideologies. Otherness, difference and plurality are 
realities certainly difficult to openly assimilate, for they imply a decon­
struction and reconstruction of our own identities.
Tolerance, therefore, has received many definitions depending upon 
the social, political and cultural valuations of diversity, otherness and 
difference. It is not an absolute reality, but signifies different points on a
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continuum, different possibilities and strategies that move from more 
passive to more pro-active understandings.38 For example, when a moral 
good such as peace is set as a social desirable goal - which is not a mi­
nor issue - then tolerance may come as a resigned acceptance of differ­
ence for the sake of that ultimate goal. Tolerance is therefore instrumen­
tal to the persecution of another moral good. This attitude may come 
very close to one where tolerance results from its lack of moral weight, 
as when a relaxed benignity stems from sheer indifference towards dif­
ferences as such. A third possibility poses tolerance as the appropriate 
attitude that must follow the recognition that others have the same uni­
versal rights that we do, similar to stoic and Kantian philosophy. Toler­
ance, therefore, is associated with the realisation of universal sameness.
All of these attitudes, however, appear today as quite brittle, fragile 
ways for facing a new phase in the collective history of humanity. Look­
ing back to history, human experience shows different political ar­
rangements to cope with difference and otherness - multinational em­
pires, millet system, consociate nations, nation-states, immigrant socie­
ties, etc. But in these regimes tolerance has always been an instrumental 
and external achievement, something necessary in order to enforce other 
ends and goods -the rule by the few, peace as controlled violence, as­
similation, economic exploitation, and so on. Yet the fragility of these 
regimes of tolerance was the latent or overt intolerant principle in-built, 
an intolerance that precisely made of “tolerance” a necessity of instru­
mental value.
These different attitudes regarding tolerance and its concomitant po­
litical regimes place difference and plurality in a shadowy spot, where 
tolerance becomes something that must be endured, ignored or made 
dependent upon a homogenising identity. Yet another two attitudes 
regarding tolerance are possible which can be envisioned as a pro-active
38 In what follows I follow Walzer’s suggestions, although with certain modifi­
cations. See On Tolerance, pp. I Os.
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response lo the challenging globalised scenario. Here the issues of dif­
ference and plurality acquire a moral quality of their own, and where 
tolerance mutates from a simple negative or condescending forbearance 
to an active form of love. The first one corresponds to an attitude of 
curiosity toward the other that leads to a respect and a willingness to 
learn. Here tolerance would be a value subsumed under a behavioural 
and epistemological openness towards that which is different, that as­
sumes the very incompleteness of our stories, traditions and being. Our 
identities are not final, but always in the making, as our epistemologies 
are ever soft, never closed.
A second one corresponds not only to a positive valuing of differ­
ence as such, but an embracing of the virtue of tolerance as a sheer and 
unwavering acceptance of the others - expressions of the largeness and 
diversity of human nature, God’s plan, or evolution. From certain ideo­
logical and religious points of view, this last scenario would constitute 
the ideal to which humanity is called - a veritable state of grace and 
love. But in a pluralistic and globalised world, this position is almost 
certain to be confined to minorities inspired by the particular axiological 
pointers of their mythic narratives. For it is impossible for tolerance to 
have the same subjective meaning for all participants in society. More­
over, psychologically a normal and sane society is one in which people 
habitually strongly disagree, since general and homogeneous agreement 
is actually rare outside the sphere of instinctive human qualities.39 But 
the main objection that can be levelled against unqualified acceptance is 
that it doesn’t leave much room for a critical appraisal of the other 
which can squarely face the constant conflict of values and interests that 
marks human reality.
Since socially and politically it is desirable to avoid a sort of bad 
utopianism that purports to uphold lofty ideals without recognising its
39 See Carl Jung, ed., Man and his Symbols (New York: Dell Publishing, 1975), 
p. 46.
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conflict with other values that we fear or dislike, we may favour the 
attitude represented by (critical) openness. Life always presses hard 
choices, which also have to be made in the larger and often conflicting 
arena of political life and arrangements. Therefore tolerance, as a moral 
practice, can be said properly to occur when we are open to communi­
cate and interact with people whose beliefs we do not necessarily adopt, 
whose practices we often decline to imitate, in sum, when we coexist 
with an otherness that in spite of its right to be, still remains different, 
alien and strange. This is tolerance as an attitude of openness, thus rec­
ognising our ongoing incompleteness and relative truth. Yet it is also a 
critical openness which attempts to balance the moral weight of other­
ness with other values seen in correspondence to this respect for other­
ness - such as freedom, peace, equality, integrity, etc. It entails not only 
the recognition that the other, with his or her truth, will perhaps never 
come closer to ours or vice versa, but also that in the exercise of our 
choices as moral beings will often set a collision course with other 
choices, interests and axiological prioritisations.
Openness, a soft epistemology, and a critical engagement with the 
other, delineate a sound psychological, affective and cognitive approach 
for the contemporary social practice of tolerance. But a critical openness 
requires that tolerance must not restrict itself to its attitudinal dimension, 
but somehow must express itself in an institutional and political form. 
Otherwise, tolerance may just breed its own demise, naively sheltering 
its own negation. A point is reached where certain values and moral 
goods must be made effective in a social and political arrangement. 
Peace allowing for coexistence, for example, marks a limit and a hori­
zon40, and so do freedom, equality and justice.
40 See Hard and Negri, Multitude, p. 311; Walzer, p. 5.
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5. Does Democracy have a Future? Tolerance as its Condition
. Tolerance, therefore, is a multileveled compound of cognitive, so­
cial, institutional and psychological factors. For tolerance to be a suc­
cessful practice, three dimensions must be addressed in the search for a 
tolerant and democratic culture and social arrangement'.
a) As the anthropologist Hofstede has shown, power distance and 
tolerance are key dimension structuring any society and culture. Its 
patterns, however, are not something that fall from above but are con­
structed through dynamics learnt in family, school and workplace.41 
Acknowledging the complex ways in which subjectivities are formed 
and reshaped by the micro-dynamics of family, religion and affection (or 
lack thereof), we cannot dismiss the psychological and symbolic ground 
that instils certain views about tolerance. Background theories, social 
experiences and religious symbols are critical factors which set the par 
rameters for an axiological universe which evokes different types of 
values.
(b) But in order for this micro-dynamic to flourish, a corresponding 
receptive environment is necessary, i.e., a democratic horizon and re­
gime that gives sustenance to the bio-political network stemming from 
the communications and relationships of the multitude. While the pat­
terns of true democracy are created in the collaborative and respectful 
cooperative practices from below, the institutional guarantees provided 
“from above” are also necessary.
(c) Finally, all that can be said about tolerance evaporates into thin 
air if the grievances and sufferings that may breed intolerant reactions 
are not redressed. Speaking about tolerance, therefore, implies, the for­
mation of a new world system where the services and resources involved 
in the business of reproducing and expanding life are more or less
41 See Hofstede, pp. 23ff.
Tolerance, Democracy and Fundamentalism 199
equally shared and fairly exchanged. In other words, tolerance calls for 
new cooperative and communicative networks of labour and production.-
Let’s have a closer look at the three levels:
To (a) The first level has to do with the psychological and epistemo­
logical openness that is communicated through mythic narratives and/or 
hermeneutics - either sacred or secular. It is the most immediate filter 
through which psychological lives of Individuals and communities are 
formed. Thoughts, feelings, intention and adaptive practices are drawn 
from the range of belief system a culture present to them. Given the late- 
modern lifting of philosophical and ideological interdicts on religion, its 
symbols, narratives and myths acquire a renewed vitality and interest. 
This poses the ethical and theological endeavour in a new light, consid­
ering the fact that values never appear in a vacuum, independent from 
mythic narratives. We do not know what the human is outside our telling 
a story that intertwines the challenges and conflicts of values that face 
the realisation of that which is the human condition. Most of these sto­
ries, however, have deep “religious” roots - either because they refer to 
a reality lying “beyond” the paramount one, or because they appear as 
“eruptions” and “gifts” from an unconscious level. Of course, these 
types of stories are effective to the extent that the primary caretakers not 
only socialise youth in this atmosphere, but are also committed to the 
realisation of values and prospects grafted into the myth.
Theological reflection offers here critical clues for the interpretations 
of these myths and symbols, enhancing thereby its formative powers. 
Notions regarding the nature of the divine, lime, space, will, animals, 
plants, land, and the human condition, have a direct effect in the way 
people situate themselves in face of otherness, plurality, and difference. 
Thus one of the foremost challenges faced by a theological discourse 
committed with critical openness would be the deconstruction of mono­
theistic God-symbols inherited from the axial age, allowing for a vision 
of transcendence able to accommodate the integrity and substantial
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difference of other beliefs and conceptions of the sacred.42 Again, it is 
not a matter of simple and uncritical acceptance, a sort of “postmodern” 
embrace of everything in order to hold nothing, but a critical openness 
that is possible because of the non-exclusivist clues provided by the 
specific convictions of one’s religion.43 Values pointing toward open­
ness and tolerance can and must be found within the integrity of one’s 
own narrative -a veritable art considering that much of religious written 
sources were carved out from the corpse of a disparaged “other”. But the 
craftsmanship of a theological endeavour will be measured by the ability 
to reconstruct a language of freedom, equality and tolerance by decon­
structing texts that once served for legitimising oppressive dominion.
This is alchemy of sorts, yet it is an urgent task since the emphasis 
upon an absolute One, either ontologically or theologically understood, 
has served as the foundation for concepts of sovereignty and dominion 
forcing the heterogeneous multitude into a suffocating Unum: One God, 
one People, one Leader.44 This level, therefore, is a key in the conforma­
tion of a spiritual and psychological otherness that would be the basis 
for any challenge to hegemonic and intolerant views. The recent history 
of Christian theology and ecumenical agreements, moving from intoler­
ance towards pro-active tolerance, shows that it is possible for a reli­
gious outlook to discover new views. We must never close this possibil­
ity to other world religions, however rigid they may seem, to explore 
new dimensions of the sacred. At the same time, it is also true that to 
create this climate, other variables must come into play, that is, key 
grievances must be institutionally and socially addressed - as we will 
mention below.
42 Cfr. Mark Heim, The Depth of Riches: a Trinitarian Theology of Religious 
Ends (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), p. 6f.
43 In the case of Christianity, the concepts of grace, agape or justification by 
faith, point to this reality.
44 Cfr. Hard and Negri, Multitude, p. 329.
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Of course, we are not only socialised through religious narratives — 
school (state) and Hollywood also possess an incredible formative 
power. Religious views are constantly intertwined with other narratives, 
“background theories” and experiences, which in turn slowly modify - 
or manipulate - the prospective tolerant dimensions found in religious 
stories. These contextual aspects can never be dismissed; pluralised 
scenarios already constitute a powerful enticement for reviewing any 
sorts of exclusivism and intolerance. But while for some this is a bless­
ing in disguise.since it catalyses values and behaviours seen as central to 
one’s own religious outlook - as can be freedom, integrity, self-esteem, 
choice, diversity - for others, however, this same scenario is simply 
harrowing, cognitively and psychologically impossible to bear, thus 
encouraging an epic account that places the stressful conscience in the 
path of either a militant, apocalyptic or messianic release. In this fash­
ion, intolerant attitudes are one of the possibilities that a confusing and 
pluralised semiotic context may elicit, seeking a sort of totalitarian order 
that promises to reduce stress by negating alterities.
To (b) Consequently the virtue of tolerance requires not only particu­
lar moral (and religious) sensitivities, but also of a political regime or 
arrangement providing the guarantees for a minimal climate of tolerance 
- which must accommodate different degrees of tolerance - precisely 
because of the crisis generated by diversity. Moral and religious sensi­
tivities, as they are not independent of certain narratives, neither are they 
uncoupled from political and structural regimes. This is the second level 
to which we referred before, which points to democracy as both a cul­
tural horizon for the containment of the multitude, as well as a political 
and institutional regime that aims to locate sovereignty in the hands of 
people.
Following the polarisation during the Cold War, the concept of de­
mocracy has been unanchored from its rigid moorings and set adrift,
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providing a new opportunity for re-conceiving it.45 In effect, the forces 
of globalization seem to pose formidable challenges, and opinions differ 
strongly as to the compatibility and future of democracy in the new 
globalised and late-modern scenario. From the left, social democratic 
arguments claim that democracy is debilitated or threatened by global­
ization, especially by its economic forces and fundamentalist reactions. 
The reassertion of the sovereignty of nation-states seems therefore the 
best strategy in the present global system. On the other hand, liberal 
cosmopolitan arguments stress that the forces of globalization, while not 
always beneficial at first, release the democratic potential of people by 
precisely promoting freedom from the rule of nation-states. From the 
right, neo-conservative ideologues stress that only the intervention by 
the coalition of the willing nations - lead by the U.S. - is able to foster 
democratic forces and institutions. Traditionalists, on the other hand, 
contest both the role of the U.S., and the compatibility of democracy 
with the cultural values of non-Westem peoples.46 None of these views, 
however, seem sufficient for confronting the new demands for tolerance, 
justice, peace and democracy. For democracy is confronted today with a 
leap of scale, where the local appears more intensively related to the 
global superseding the mediation offered by the boundaries of traditional 
nation-states. The present grievances against political, ecological and 
economic aspects, including the current state of war, are all symptoms of 
a crisis within the present world system, a rebellion against the formal 
mechanisms of sovereignty and its failing system of representation and 
decision making processes.
More than ever, local problems demand global solutions, and there­
fore tolerance as an active practice that signals openness to other expres­
sions of the multitude is a key value in the conformation of a new bio­
political and democratic network capable of addressing and redressing
45 See Ibid, p. 232.
46 See Ibid, pp. 233-237.
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harmful, divisive, and exploitative scenarios. The tolerance that is ex­
pressed through this democratic network becomes thus a key factor for 
peace; for peace is not merely the absence of violence and war, but the 
basic precondition for reason, imagination, desire, emotions, feelings 
and affections, working its anarchic but lively ways through the maze of 
our world. Without tolerance, without peace, no cooperation, communi­
cation, forms of life and social relationships can emerge from the in­
credible potentiality of the swarming multitude. These are the weapons 
that signal the democratic critique of arms, launching a critique of the 
massive means of destruction at disposal of the core powers of the sys­
tem, as well as of the equally disturbing weapons of the dispossessed, 
namely, the immolation of their own bodies. While these martyrdoms 
may well be considered a response to destruction and injustice, and a 
cunning strategy to deny sovereign exploitative powers of their object of 
sovereignty (the bodies of people), it is still a cog of intolerance that fits 
well in the grinding machine of the present world system.
To (c) as the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr once asserted, human ca­
pability for justice makes of democracy something possible; but its in­
clination to injustice makes of democracy something necessary.47 The 
same can be said regarding tolerance. Therefore democracy should be 
measured both by its capability to voice grievance pertaining to a singu­
lar group as well as by the ability to connect different kinds of groups: 
economic, representation, poverty, human rights, education, ecology and 
health. These grievances give countenance to a multitude through which 
the future of democracy is at stake. This requires of a bio-political de­
mocratic ethics, that it bridge ideas, hopes and affection allowing an 
emotional yet also rational identification with a network of differentiated 
democratic power.
47 Cfr. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944).
204 Overcoming Fundamentalism
With this we reach a third level that relates to how we redress global 
and local grievances, above all, of economic, social and ecological na­
tures - different forms of intolerance that also generate intolerant reac­
tions. If the “world-system” cannot show possibilities toward a more 
egalitarian arrangement, then the appeal of fundamentalisms will cer­
tainly be strengthened. For grievances and suffering bring us to the bed­
rock of human existence; it is the source of “local knowledge” that sig­
nals the inadequacies of ideological, social and economic systems.48 
Grievances, therefore, voice the “insurrection of subjugated know­
ledges” against hegemonic ideologies - which also include the different 
forms of fundamentalisms.49 Of course, suffering is never without inter­
pretation, but our bodies make of it a mediated immediacy, enclosing 
thus a negative universality challenging programmes and systems that 
thrive on elusive promises and concrete duress.
Deprivation and poverty may breed anger, indignation and antago­
nism, but revolt arises only on the basis of “wealth” - a surplus of intel­
ligence, vision, experience, knowledge and desire that is generated by a 
shift in social practices and cultural patterns. Here lies, precisely, the 
inadequacy of the intolerant strategies and weapons of fundamentalisms 
for a pluralised scenario crossed by grievances of every sort. They recoil 
from the most fundamental weapon of all, a pro-active tolerance that 
comes with love. Without it, neither justice nor peace can permeate the 
increasing webs connecting us all in this fragile but beautiful planet. We 
are not saying that fundamentalists are incapable of loving, or that they 
are all equally “violent,” but that they are blind to the political dimen­
sion of love. In this they are not alone; if both the forces that create 
economic disparities as well as many of the fundamentalist reactions
48 Cfr. Francis Schiissler Fiorenza, “The Crisis of Hermeneutics and Christian 
Theology,” in Sheila Greeve Davaney, ed., Theology at the End of Modernity 
(Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1991), p. 135.
49 See Michael Foucault, Power/Knowledge (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1982), pp. 80f.
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make of violent behaviour and intolerance a prime weapon in this time 
of bifurcation, then violence can only grow exponentially until it de­
stroys us all.
This is why fundamentalism is a symptom of the disruptive forces of 
an unfair globalization, but not its cure. It is one of the powerful fluctua­
tions indicating a possible bifurcation. But so are the powerful cultural 
and political experiences disclosing a common bio-political desire that 
rests on a pro-active exercise of tolerance as an affirmation of life in its 
multiple expressions. For that to happen, the fight for democracy must 
always be tied to a relentless pursuit of fairness and the eradication of 
poverty, which can only be reachable through a serious reorientation of 
the disparities generated by capitalism and its global division of labour. 
For only when the grievances of the majority are duly heard and re­
dressed, when we are ready to look at the grim face of asymmetrical 
power, then shall we be able to walk in the full promise and creative 
force of tolerance and democratic affirmation.
